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Between Order and Modernity: Resurgence Planning in Revolutionary 
Egypt 
Abstract 
(J\SW¶V5HYROXWLRQRISUHVHQWHGDPDMRUKLVWRULFDOFKDQJH to its political 
and economic structure, its society and its institutions. This paper examines how 
1DVVHU¶V regime operated through the state apparatus to exhibit features of 
modernity. Under the pretext of modernisation, renovating &DLUR¶V authentic 
urban fabric was one of the channels that displayed the new ambitions to unveil 
a centralised system of governance and ideologies of socialism. The paper 
particularly looks at the city¶V resurgence attempts, promoted by notions of 
upgrading that displayed outcomes of western ideals of planning. Eventually, 
the contradictory planning legislative system introduced by the government 
raised early alarms at the problems encountered in a planning institution that 
was not only XQDEOH WR OLEHUDWH &DLUR¶V XUEDQ districts from its long-rooted 
decay, but also struggled to implement WKH UHJLPH¶V flagship policy of social 
justice in a context wherein it was much needed. 
Keywords: Modernisation; Socialism; legislations; Cairo; old districts; planning 
institutions. 
 
Introduction 
When inaugurated in the late nineteenth century, the Eiffel Tower celebrated the centennial of 
the French Revolution and gradually turned into a global cultural icon. The Cairo Tower, 
constructed in 1961, similarly held a narrative of success. The freestanding concrete tower, 
imitating styles of the pharaonic antiquity, was designed to become a masterpiece landmark 
of structural excellence to celebrate the rise of the new republic XQGHU*DPDO$EGHO1DVVHU¶V
rule. Following the Free Officers revolution in 1952, DQGSURFODLPLQJ(J\SW¶VLQGHSHQGHQFH
the WRZHU¶Vcompletion was a matter of civic pride WRµH[SUHVVGHILDQFHRIIRUHLJQLQIOXHQFHLQ
(J\SW¶.1 Writers claimed that its construction was a game of restoring the balance in 
Egyptian-American politics, but this remains in question till this day.2 The modern tower that 
stood in the heart of Cairo provided endless sights of WKHFLW\¶V modern and ancient districts.3 
It complemented a series of recently constructed buildings in nearby downtown Cairo, e.g. 
the Nile Hilton Hotel, the Arab League building and the Socialist Union Headquarters, that 
played an auguring role in the development of popular opinion and national identity.4 These 
buildings were a highlight of the modern urbanism envisioned to articulate a distinctive phase 
of the new Egypt, as per Nasser what dreamt of and manifested in his thoughts and writings 
(Figure 1).5 
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Historians of this period have mutually depicted the intertwined planning ambitions in 
nineteenth-century European cities as compounded with politics for reshaping their cities.6 
This phase of politicised urbanism is evident.7 Outcomes of the city urbanism were products 
of endless debate and compromises, which represented an anxious union between political 
powers, private gain and public good.8 Master plans, in their graphical forms, reveal the 
prevailing ideologies of regimes they sustain.9 Paris, for example, was planned in an 
H[FOXVLYH VSDWLDO PRGHO µZKLFK UHPDLQV DIWHU Haussmann and the fall of the Empire a 
FRQGLWLRQHG WRZQ SODQQLQJ DSSURDFK¶.10 On the other hand, the prosperity of postcolonial 
cities was less discussed in scholarly writings, probably for its disappointing outcomes.11 
Critics have been heaping scorn upon plans that only documented phases of capitalism and 
the exploitation of the people.12 Contemporary academic commentary has resuscitated the 
query stemming from the paradox of urban modernity; how it set targets and instrumental 
actions in reshaping urban spaces with relatively coherent goals of political stability, spatial 
order, the will to improve the city, and primarily the question of how governmental 
interventions have been indoctrinated, opposed, hybridised or ignored.  
Following the revolution, &DLUR¶V resurgence was shaped by the shift from the colonial 
past towards a future exposed to the outer world. For Nasser, the past was summarily 
VDFULILFHG WR MXVWLI\ WKH UHYROXWLRQ¶V VXFFHVV )URP one perspective, urban planning was a 
representative document of the course of a new spatial discourse practised under 1DVVHU¶V
socialist government. The government, predominantly led by his loyal officers, expanded its 
sphere of activity in the organisation of space to counter the effect of economic and 
demographic forces.13 During that period, the government continued to draw migrants into 
Cairo to contribute to its industrial development and modern commerce. This led to the 
population increasing from 267.000 people in 1947 to 350.000 in 1960, many of which settled 
in informal housing in the inner parts of the city lacking basic infrastructure.14 Several social 
housing blocks were constructed in vibrant locations to absorb the growth which soon had its 
own problems. The projects in most cases ignored the social and physical contexts, thus 
causing over population and unregulated mixed-use spaces. 
Both trends to modernisH &DLUR¶V XUEDQLVP DQG organise its urban growth were the 
vehicles feeding 1DVVHU¶V progress visions during his presidency. Driven by ambition, the 
reception of master plans drafted to modernise &DLUR¶V old districts operated under limited 
appreciation. The schemes were received as aggressive acts of urban change that overlooked 
fundamental principles of urban regeneration and to replace low-class communities. One 
indication is that their implementation was overlooked, despite that planning ideas were 
practised under further scrutiny of application that included the context of stabilising the 
apparatus of the machines, and the formal bodies and systems needed to establish urban 
change. This paper aims to investigate Nasser¶V ambitions to transform &DLUR¶VXUEDQ form 
under ideas of spatial modernisation and resurgence. The argument proffered is WKDW1DVVHU¶V
socialist visions for creating a reformed state relied on typical models of modern urbanism 
that proved unsuitable for the older districts of Cairo. The paper will explain how 
modernisation attempts, under 1DVVHU¶V UXOH was translated into superficial actions, 
legislations and practices in the sense of the supersession of the modernisation conceptions 
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that was not only informed by the districts¶XUEDQSUREOHPVEXWDWWKHVDPHWLPHZDVWKRXJKW
to reflect a willingness to engage the city in a modern resurgence of distant splendour. This 
should not reflect on criticising the outcome as the justification of the process, but the 
chronicling of visions that informed resurgence planning at that time. It looks at how the 
process of imposing an imaginary superficial modernity became attuned the inherited spatial 
traditions of these districts to anticipate satisfactory outcomes and to define modernised urban 
spaces.  
For this, when tackling issues of urban planning in Cairo, it is only appropriate to touch 
upon the complex practices of the planning institution as the main driver of the discipline. 
The Cairo Governorate, which initiated all planning endeavours under Nasser, thus becomes a 
reasonable showcase. The paper entails an interdisciplinary approach to investigate these 
practices, relying widely on key literature and first-hand resources. Fortunately, limited 
drawings and visual materials still survive in the Governorate archives, while all planning 
acts were regularly published in the Egyptian Gazette and provided a continual record of the 
live accounts of planning in Cairo. Significant scholars who researched Cairo with critical 
accounts of this period were rich resource and are repeatedly cited, such as Janet Abu-
Lughod, Nasser Rabbat, Max Rodenbeck, Nezar alSayyad and others. Each section of this 
paper responds to a subsequent layer of the discussion, initially through contextualising ideas 
of modernising a city that was captured under colonisation for decades and therefore it 
highlights KRZ1DVVHU¶Vmodernisation visions recalled global ideas to transform Cairo. The 
discussion then moves to assess the planning institution actions, planning legislations and 
building control and procedures, which reveal the credibility of ideas of modernity; how were 
they employed and thought to be spatialised? The final section explains how the planning 
institution performance outcomes were artificial and ill defined and struggled to proceed with 
PRGHUQLVLQJWKHFLW\¶VROGHUdistricts.   
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The Urbanism of Liberation, Order and Modernisation 
µXUEDQLVPLVLWVHOISROLWLFDO« The city must be considered a 
IXQFWLRQDOHOHPHQWRIWKHQDWLRQ¶ (Kirk 2006) 
 
The relationship between state politics and the built environment is blurred. Physical 
structures of the public realm had been constantly shaped by political powers and systems of 
governance.15 Literature on colonial urbanism emphasised that its authoritative contexts of 
political powers16 tend to attain urban order and disciplined solidarity of social engineering by 
the imposition of master plans. 17 Historians argue that planned districts and model housing 
were territorial mechanisms designed to represent the legitimacy of their empires,18 as spatial 
displays of the geographical imagination of colonialism.19 With limited exceptions, the 
colonial city portrayed the image of a dual city: RQHVHFWLRQUHSUHVHQWVWKHFLW\¶VQDWLYHSODFHV
and ignored districts, while the other composed quarantined, delicately planned areas 
featuring European architecture and urbanism.  
As liberation recalled ideas of national identity and socialism, not surprisingly, re-planning 
those cities followed similar lines of urban intervention associated with regimes sharing a 
highly centralised structure of power.20 The legacy of previous colonial control necessitated a 
break with the old political order to proclaim the transformation of all spheres of life, 
Fig. 1. The Cairo Tower constructed in 1961.  
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including the public realm. Under the rising call for modernisation and urban order, grand 
Haussmann-style boulevards replaced the authentic urban fabric of many cities with the 
display of strong visual structures of buildings, squares and streets as symbol of authority, 
supremacy and discipline. In the 1920s, for example, Rome and its history had been engaged 
in celebrating a modern, dynamic and progressive capital worthy of its new leader.21 
Buildings that displayed power are still visible around that city and would have been even 
more widespread had the Fascist regime lasted longer. A further personified mentality for 
planning Moscow following the revolution of 1917 was evident in the architecture of the 
time, many of which would later be judged µnot by what was actually built, but on what they 
were not allowed to include¶.22  
One view is that the urban experience has been greatly misused with the premeditated 
integration of planning practices into rigidly choreographed reform operations,23 where the 
focus on the image ignored local social matters to the extent that visions for change remained 
unchanged from preceding practices.24 A central role in the enforcement of political control 
was sustained often under the pretext of national western styles.25 On one hand, this phase of 
urbanity did not necessarily display successful outcomes, and failed to resolve conflicts that 
plagued the original urban fabric of those settlements.26 Conflict reached the level that 
governments were sometimes µIRUFHG WR XVH WKH WHUPV RI WKH H[LVWLQJ RUGHU ZLWK DOO LWV
baggage of physical realities and ideological constructV¶LQRUGHUWRDFKLHYHWKLVQHZVWDJHRI
sovereignty,27 where ideas of standardisation, segregation and neglect remain common 
practices.28 Being obsessed with modernity destined imitating western models of urban 
development as the ultimate reference,29 in anticipation of subverting not only the physical 
products of their occupation but also the individual occupant¶s memories.30  
Planning Cairo during Nasser¶Vregime was not an isolated effort to modernise the nation. 
This period, to a certain extent, remains for all Egyptians a genuine association with 
0XKDPPDG $OL¶s modernisation project during the nineteenth century. The latter was 
described as WKH µIRXQGHU RI PRGHUQ (J\SW¶31 DQG WKH IRUPHU NQRZQ DV WKH µERRVWHU RI
PRGHUQLVDWLRQ¶32. Both leaders commonly engineered visions that pulled out Egypt from its 
shadowed ages of traditionalism, both establishing a strong industrialisation base and 
determination of reviving WKH FLW\¶V EXLOW HQYLURQPHQW +RZHYHU 1DVVHU went far beyond 
those of Ali¶s, with an intention to create a secular Arab nationalism in the Middle East to 
unite all Arab nations.33 The years of his rule recorded new social reform policies and 
remarkable structural change for advancing reorganisation in his socialist state.34 Part was to 
write a modern planning constitution of urban development that would manage restructuring 
(J\SW¶VEXLOWVFDSHDIWHUWKH%ULWLVKRFFXSDWLRQZLWKGUDZDO35 Essential to this vision was the 
physical appearance of modern buildings and planned districts that visualise the ideals into 
everyday experience particularly visible through the new government. Projects for an 
independent national economy required new governance bodies to chief progressive policies 
and oversee implementation.36 Grand projects such as the Aswan High Dam, national 
buildings and bridges, and social housing were all constructive initiatives to materialise the 
striving for such ambitions.  
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The location of Cairo as the metropolitan centre of the new state led Nasser to grant 
strategic locations in its central heart, to prove that Egypt was moving away from its past. The 
JLJDQWLF 0RJDPPD FRPSOH[ ZDV WKH ILUVW EXLOGLQJ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK (J\SW¶V OLEHUDWLRQ
inaugurated in the southwest corner of Isamiliyya Square, later renamed the Tahrir Square 
after the revolution.37 Not surprisingly, the regime associated the square with memories of 
colonisation, since British troops had taken over the Qasr al-Nil barracks as part of their 
conquest of the country in 1882. According to Nasser 5DEEDWWKHVTXDUHµHYROYHGWRUHIOHFW
WKHFKDQJLQJSROLWLFDOLGHRORJ\RIWKHJRYHUQPHQWDIWHUWKHUHYROXWLRQ¶DVWKHQDPHZDVQR
PRUH WKDQD UHIHUHQFH WR WKH UHYROXWLRQ¶V VXFFHVV in terminating the British occupation and 
hence liberating Egypt.38 Year after year, the Tahrir zone became filled with modern 
buildings that commonly shared similar lines of the national style architecture, in which the 
Cairo Tower was no exception (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Giza 
Fig 2. Map of Greater Cairo region, 2003 
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Modernising Cairo also encapsulated methods of social engineering and disciplined 
VROLGDULW\1DVVHUUHSUHVHQWHGDQ(J\SWLDQHIIRUWWRLPSODQWµVFLHQWLILFVRFLDOLVWplanning... and 
 DQ H[WUHPHO\ VWUXFWXUHG HQYLURQPHQW¶39 On the planning front, modernisation envisaged 
specific features of classical planning that carefully displayed linear streets and organised 
living. New districts in Cairo with sliced grids of wide streets and building blocks emulated 
modern urbanism ideals such as Sahafeyyen WKH MRXUQDOLVWV¶ TXDUWHU 0RKDQGVHHQ WKH
HQJLQHHUV¶TXDUWHUDQGNasr City (the city of victory), all assigned to a particular professional 
occupation40 to set the exemplar life patterns for ordinary Egyptians living in new 
settlements.41 Also the Tahrir (liberation) province was µD PRGHO IRU WKH FRQYHUVLRQ RI ROG
lands to modern collective agriculture, which would increase the available land for 
cultivation¶42 Planning these districts not only aimed to provide housing capacity to the 
growing middle-class population43 EXWDOVRLQWHQGHGWREHHPEOHPDWLFRI&DLUR¶VPRGHUQHUD
of rational and technocratic planning.44 Nasser was in fact advocating similar developments 
as the primary solution to curb population growth despite that some projects showed rapid 
signs of failure in early 1960s, what led Nasser in 1965 to admit in an interview that it was an 
H[DPSOHRIµPXGGOHGSODQQLQJDQGFRQIXVHGWKLQNLQJ¶45 (Figure 3) 
$WWKLVVWDJHLWFRXOGEHDUJXHGWKDWSODQQLQJLQWHUYHQWLRQVLQ&DLUR¶VSXEOLFUHDOPVLQFH
the mid-twentieth century independence followed immensely politicised tones. By using the 
term µpoliticised¶, the paper reflects on the process of engineering visions and procedures to 
idealise the planning bodies and planning legislations and assure commitment in satisfying 
certain economic-political goals and also to confirm financial resources for its operation. 
Nevertheless, such types RI SODQV DUH QRW RQO\ VKDSHG E\ WKH SODQQHUV¶ DHVWKHVLV EXW DOVR
based on cultural and social concerns that act in shaping different objectives and outcomes, 
which is also considered political. For this, politicised urbanism determines a process that 
invades the legislations, procedures and course of implementation. This forms the theoretical 
and physical trends, which accordingly is translated to schemes which later revealed negative 
implications to the physical urban fabric. It prioritised the interests of state government over 
planning ambitions. In addition, political influences can intrude on designs, not only by 
controlling the process and its priorities, but also by seeking to appropriate the built 
environment with reference to certain values. 
To understand this phase of Cairo¶V GHYHORSPHQW, the paper will proceed with a deeper 
investigation to understand the context of the old districts of Cairo and to shed light on the 
actual sources of their decline. In the following discussion, I will argue that the political 
instability since the 1952 revolution led to a confused vision of modernity that brought about 
further chaos and damage to these areas.  6WHHULQJ &DLUR¶V XUEDQ IDEULF LQ WKH SDWK RI
induVWULDO XUEDQLVP PRUHRYHU FRQIURQWHG WKH FLW\¶V WUDGLWLRQDO VWUXFWXUHV ZLWK
accommodating large factories and houses for workers. In particular, problems with the 
newly introduced legislative planning system were compounded by delayed response from 
the Governorate, which resulted in areas falling into a continuous state of decline46.  
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The proliferation of disorder in &DLUR¶Vurban fabric 
The traditional and old districts of Cairo are places where memories of the past could be 
found and where layers of spatial transformations over centuries have left their imprints on 
living patterns and local customs.47 History and sociological researchers have described these 
districts as discrete entities, characterised by clear physical boundaries, narrow and tight 
alleyways, which constituted the primary urban units of Islamic Cairo.48 A glued  compact 
tissue of low-rise houses  and buildings dominate the alleyways and define its spatial 
structure. For centuries, &DLUR¶V,VODPLFFRUHZDVa well-established metropolitan centre that 
represented all sections of society with discrete and authentic character until the late 
nineteenth century. It was then greatly hit by tKH VWDWH¶V QHJOHFW following the Khedive 
,VPDLO¶V plans for introducing new European districts in Cairo. Over the first half of the 
twentieth century, and following decades of migration waves from the abandoned countryside 
in search of secured and regular wages in the capital, a lower class population with 
unregulated commercial activities characterised the alleyways¶ urban life.49 The population 
Fig. 3. Planning of Nasr City in 1956. 
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increase and lack of maintenance also had a crucial impact on the proliferation of decline in 
these old districts, which led to their being collectively characterised as impoverished areas.  
 The old districts¶ decline reached a precipitate stage following the Suez crisis in 1956, 
which forced immediate migration to Cairo. A second wave occurred IROORZLQJ 1DVVHU¶V
industrialisation venture initiated in the same year. Districts such as Sayyda Zainab, close to 
the industrial poles, soon became filled with workers, pushing out middle-class residents, who 
left for newer districts, such as Mohandseen and Dokki, located in the western and northern 
sections of Cairo. The authentic districts absorbed massive numbers of these migrants, who 
remain until today, not far from Tahrir Square. They initiated a considerable amount of 
industrial activity, causing additional disruption to street patterns and land uses. In a total 
absence of adherence to building regulations, new constructions combined shops and 
warehouses with historical or religious buildings in complex and mixed-use structures. 
,QGHHG WKH LPDJH RI GHFOLQH ZDV IUDPHG VWDUNO\ DJDLQVW 1DVVHU¶V SODQV WR PRGHUQLVH WKH
country. (Figure 4) 
1DVVHU¶VULJRXUWRLQFUHDVHWKHVSUHDGRIKLVVRFLDOLVWDJHQGDZDVQRWOLPLWHGWRGHYHORSLQJ
new locations, but also focused on improving inner sectors of the inhabited city. The problem 
was much more sophisticated than it appeared, and restoration required professional action. In 
the early 1960s, several meetings were arranged by the 6th Committee (lagnat al-Sitta) at the 
Governorate to discuss upgrading possibilities and the importance of making significant 
changes to the urban settings. 50 The aim was to employ a studied strategy to assist 200 
thousand people living in crowded dwellings which were basically concentrated in Sayyda 
Zainab, and Misr al-Qadima. It was also denoted that the increasing decline had condemned 
the residents to very poor living conditions which affected their assets and habits in a way 
that could never be resolved. A social researcher survey conducted in one of the districts 
stated that: 
µLn haret ( alleyway) 0XKDPPDGµ$OLLQ%XODT«LQDQDSDUWPHQWRIWZRURRPVOLYHG
Moaoud abu al-0DJG¶V family, a worker at the rail station. The family is composed of 
nine persons, their monthly income does not exceed nine pounds, their home was never 
supplied with electricity so they rely on gas bulbs for night lighting and they are dependent 
on water peddlers for water supply. Also, they never visit the doctor as they rely on cheap 
traditional prescriptions; the street is their only chance to learn their attitudes and habits, 
DQGILQDOO\HGXFDWLQJDJLUOLVDQXQIRUJLYDEOHLQLTXLW\¶51  
The challenge in Cairo was not easy and required a critical long-term improvement 
strategy. Nasser realised that boosting modern urbanism required a solid system of planning 
institutions capable of managing and carrying out long-term plans through direct intervention 
and, somehow, forceful action. The materialisation of plans required the influence of proper 
legislative mechanisms through a new perspective of a reality juncture and modern 
authenticity of modernisation. Indeed, such ambitions continue to the present day, with a 
SHUVLVWHQW IRFXV RQ UHVWUXFWXULQJ &DLUR¶V SK\VLFDO VHWWLQJV +RZHYHU WKLV SDSHU OLPLWV LWV
H[SORUDWLRQWRWKHSHULRGRI1DVVHU¶V\HDUVRIpolitically driven planning, during which early 
hopes IRU GHYHORSLQJ &DLUR¶V XUEDQLVP were significant footsteps to establish this new 
context of reality: by formalising an agency of change with a dominant ideology in the new 
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administrative and governance structure; and by establishing the apparatus which is the 
substance of practical procedures to realise a modern image of the city. The numerous 
conditions that contributed to the destruction of the old districts had reached a level that 
REOLJHG1DVVHU¶VJRYHUQPHQWWRSD\VLJQLILFDQWDWWHQWLRQWRLWin light of the previous lack of 
prioritisation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Planning &DLUR¶Vdistricts: Ambitions of modernity 
In the wake of the revolution, long-established centres of power and the dominance of certain 
institutions typified the political scene. By 1952, while Cairo was managed by a strong 
system of central government, municipal control was largely ineffective. Four years later, 
Nasser subjugated his political opponents, while initial signs of control became visible and 
paved the way for his anticipated change and display of modern society.52 He believed that 
gradual action ZRXOG VXSSRUW WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V initiative to implement institutional and 
ideological change. Hence, the positive path to modernise Egypt, in his view, inevitably 
necessitated establishment of a body of institutions to take responsibility for rendering his 
vision a reality.  
Following the overhaul of the colonial era institutions, and despite their conservative 
methods of municipal implementation, Nasser recruited ex-officers in high rank 
 
)LJ7LPEHUZRUNVKRSVLQRQHRI&DLUR¶VROGTXDUWHUV mixed with other types of housing and 
religious land uses. 
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administrative positions to support introduction of reform in national institutions. This was a 
substantial challenge for these military personnel, whose experience and abilities in 
governing a nation were rather limited.53 Major figures in the military were explicit about 
inaugurating grand projects WR FRPPXQLFDWH WKH UHYROXWLRQ¶V YLVLRQs, with some having µa 
unique ability to dream, to deliver and to visualise these dreams.¶54 An enthusiasm that 
grasped 1DVVHU¶VSDVVLRQWRH[HUWDPHDQLQJIXOLQIOXHQFHRQFKDQJLQJWKHXUEDQH[SHULHQFHDV
part of the rHYROXWLRQ¶V success and which had a significant role in outlining building 
legislation acts that followed.  
 Building regulations had frequently been introduced to assume control over the built 
environment in both the short and long term. They were anticipated to provide more clarity 
for the planning authorities in steering modernisation, whether during the Muhammad Ali, 
Ismail Pasha, or Nasser era. &DLUR¶V Vpatial appearance, in this particular context of post 
1952, was defined in terms of regulating street and building forms, including the size, height, 
style, and character, which in effect constituted the characteristics of the visual quality of 
outdoor spaces. In retrospect, Law 51 /1940, for example, was an early legislation to regulate 
on building construction within residential blocks/areas55. While governing building heights 
was an attempt to permit the proper amount of daylight and ventilation to access buildings 
and public streets, it formed an effective method of controlling the floor area ratio and the 
efficiency of the road network and public infrastructure and services. But the law did not list 
any exceptions to this rule or the building height principle, which leads us to assume that it 
was applicable to all sections of the city as it µwas prohibited to build or modify any building 
unless it followed the mandatory rules listed in the building act.56  
Further formalisation of modernisation visions occurred in 1954 when the planning 
institution issued Law 656/1954 to address what seemed to be inadequate implementation of 
previous acts. Supplementary articles appeared to chiefly authorise and reinforce involvement 
of the Governorate regarding new developments, such as the rapid increase in private car 
ownership.57 For example, one article stressed WKDW µQR DGPLQLVWUDWLYH ERG\ LV DOORZHG WR
intervene or impose specific regulations in certain areas, such as land use, building style, 
colours or materials that affect the visual appearance of buildings¶.58 Other clauses set 
requirements for building setbacks and obligated owners to supply parking spaces in 
DFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHEXLOGLQJV¶DYHUDJHOHYHORIRFFXSDQF\ 
)ROORZLQJRQIURPWKHVWDWH¶VRYHUZKHOPLQJGHVLUHWRSURGXFHXUEDQLPDJHVRIPRGHUQLW\
within a homogeneous urban fabric (buildings, streets), regulations that governed street 
network (width and overlooking building heights) in the older sections of Cairo were 
prioritised over a more comprehensive approach. This proved problematic in terms of 
regulating a standard system for building heights. Even though previous regulations 
controlled building heights in mathematical relationship to street width, contradicting laws 
could yet be detected. Law 656/1954, in contrast, allowed flexibility through the potential for 
building height to be extended within a method of recessed blocks to add additional floors 
and authorising for different scenarios and situations that in fact supported inaugurating high-
rise buildings in Cairo for the first time. 59(Figure 5) 
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Apparently, construction of HFRQRPLFKRXVLQJXQLWVDGMDFHQWWRWKHUHVLGHQWV¶ZRUNSODFHV
was a common theme delivered by Governorate officials, but strikingly, the units were built 
in saturated districts close to industrial poles. That said, there was a tendency to create 
uniform images of living, which reflected an unmistakable ideology of politicised socialism 
and would vitally support anticipated visions of nation building. Improving spatial settings 
was nothing to do with gaining the satisfaction of the users of these spaces. Rather, the urge 
to eradicate visible signs of deterioration or select certain areas for development was, in 
principle, due to the centralised drive to upgrade spatial settings for developing economic 
activities and attracting investment. In a number of situations, people resisted such action, 
fearing the permanent loss of their properties, part-houses, or even privileges in the local 
context as a consequence of such urban improvement plans or expropriation decisions. 
While private companies were regarded as feasible instruments for boosting modernisation 
alongside public planning bodies, their influence was minimal and strictly controlled. 
Following the Suez Canal nationalisation in 1956, the majority of these companies and 
developers were nationalised and came under the direct control of larger public sector and 
cooperatives organisations.60  Only under this umbrella did they become involved in the arena 
of housing supply and participated in the general development policies. However, conflict 
over authority between the municipality of Rural Affairs, the municipal body of that time, and 
private organisations proliferated, particularly as the housing shortage in Cairo became more 
acute when census reports showed that 40,000 buildings in Cairo were in a dilapidated state. 
With introducing new programs of upgrading and slum clearance, as stated above, different 
government agencies and suppliers got involved in housing developments. Nevertheless, the 
cooperative institutions favoured the construction of middle and high-income housing 
projects in order to gain higher profits, while low-income housing was in fact left in the hands 
of the Governorate, with its limited budget and lack of management. 
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The agency of awareness and response  
µ7KH  SODQQLQJ VFKHPH RI &DLUR KDG WKH GRXEOH LQWHQW RI
sticking the bits of the city together again and of preventing a bigger 
FDWDVWURSKH¶61 
 
The establishment of the Governorate structure marked a new era for spatial development 
in Egypt, mainly through government recognition of the destructive impact of 
industrialisation. This awareness led to enthusiastic attitudes towards urban renewal as merely 
surface solutions to deeper problems, particularly when major tragedies LQ &DLUR¶V
infrastructure emerged. One incident transpired prior the revolution on the 26th of January 
1952 when fire blazed through the streets of Cairo downtown, affecting cinemas, bars, shops, 
hotels, clubs, and many houses had to be evacuated and 400 buildings had been destroyed.62  
 
Fig. 5 The imaginary plane for building heights 
Left: the method of the imaginary plane for extra building heights  
Right: The resulting quality of central areas in Cairo, implemented according to Law 656/1954, 
and what followed 
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Due to the extent of the damage, repairs took a long time, with efforts being focused on the 
central section and main roads. Apparently, the mission was only partially accomplished, as, 
for example, houses were either not repaired or were superficially cleaned up on the outside.63  
Instant measures to implement the modernity visions were underway shortly after the new 
system was in place. With the official establishment of the Governorate in the early 1960s, a 
phase of awareness toward the quality of the built environment resulted in introducing a 
cohesive mechanism of design control for building regulations647KH LQVWLWXWLRQ¶V UHVSRQVH
however, was dictated by the perceived modern practice of modular designs and mass 
housing projects. The vernacular urban fabric of the old city was seen as images of the past 
that must give way to the future. This response was also marked by the introduction of an 
impressive body of laws and regulation, which were enacted to respond to all aspects of urban 
development, from land subdivision to master planning, building codes and infrastructure65. 
The regulations were intended to introduce some control over quality of design in the broader 
development plans of the city. Although previous planning guidance drew heavily on similar 
issues, Law 45/1962 was introduced to foster particular obligations over built spaces in Cairo.  
The introductory statement of the explanatory note stated that: 
µ,W LV HYLGHQW WKDW ODZ/1954 had failed to cope with the modernization of 
WKHFLW\¶Vadministrative systems which requires further simplification of several 
procedures. It was also noticeable that all engineering and technical building 
regulations listed in the previous law, and which are basic requirements of any 
buildings, are not compatible with the modern development of architectural and 
planning trends of the city of Cairo. This lack had caused an imbalanced contrast 
of visual and physical characteristics in different areas of the state which requires 
XUJHQWFRQVLGHUDWLRQDQGDFWLRQ¶.66        
 
The first six articles focused on administrative matters regarding the process of issuing 
building permits, and the circumstances for their approval. The limitations became apparent 
in article (10), which acknowledged the failure to adhere to standard building regulations and 
the lack of public utilities. While this act was developed to tackle the problems of the many 
buildings in old districts that were illegally constructed, its implementation proved, in the 
long term, to be impractical due to the deprived context and lack of infrastructure and access 
to public utilities which had not only damagingly affected local public health, but also had a 
remarkable impact on the built space quality.  
Moreover, problems of failing infrastructure and high population put these areas in urgent 
need of spatial improvement, particularly as acts in Law 45/1962 emphasised instant actions 
of urban resurgence by opening new streets or regulating existing ones. Many illegal 
structures, which stand evident until today, such as temporary and shelter houses, had never 
been supplied with public services such as sanitation, water supply, and electricity. From the 
mid 1960s, the Governorate initiated XSJUDGLQJVFKHPHVWRRIIHUµexpedient solutions to the 
chaos found in these districts¶67 Namely, the Cairo Renewal Project aimed to build twenty-
two new districts in the Greater Cairo Region and to combine ten thousand economic housing 
units in 245 large buildings of different types of apartments.68 Residents of several of these 
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areas were informed of the plan to displace them from zones approved for clearance, 
demolition, and re-planning.69 Schemes displayed the design and amendments of street paths 
as common features, without being specific about the exact space that would be added to 
street width, or how these amendments would affect building heights. This was, in fact, part 
of a silent government plan to displace low-class population from central urban districts to 
the periphery of the city. The Governorate, after denying them access to public services, 
designated these sites for development and issued decrees for urban clearance and the 
relocation of the local population. Legislations, hence, were manipulated by the state as a tool 
to implement the government agenda of social engineering in deprived areas.  
The Governorate¶V unconvincing attitude led to negative reactions from the residents, 
particularly in those controversial clearance situations. Recorded accounts of the residents 
showed a clear frustration and deliberate resistance. The outcomes of a social study 
conducted in 1962 to investigate the practicality of the displacement plans revealed further 
obstacles to the implementation of the renewal projects based on the new acts.70 . On one 
hand, frustrated accounts of those relocated to the peripheral Tahrir province, for example, 
emotionally fuelled the residents with fears of ending up living in desert lands.71 The 
majority, mainly migrants who did not usually abide by the law, refused to abandon their 
homes, and were prepared to carry on living in these districts while facing daily problems of 
water and electricity shortages.72 2QWKHRWKHUKDQGRIILFLDOV¶GLVPLVVLYHSHUFHSWLRQs of the 
rural culture and entrenched attitudes among the residents had impacted on relocation 
decisions, leading to confrontation and forceful behaviour.73 This was largely perceived as an 
indication of hidden plans for permanent and large scale relocation of vulnerable groups and 
their workplaces to the city outskirts, with no possibility of return. This legacy of distrust and 
suspicion of hidden intentions between the people and the state has demarcated the urban 
scene in the city until this day. No matter whether the original cause of the problem was the 
low income groups or the lack of proper housing  and living conditions, these ineffective and 
dubious governance practices DIIHFWHG QRW RQO\ WKH VWDWH¶V resurgence ambitions but stood 
against its authority to change the face of Cairo. It became apparent that the implicit intention 
to captivate the dream image of the clean and prosperous modern city to 1DVVHU¶VVDWLVIDFWLRQ 
was the ultimate goal of the government, if not its only mission. (Figure 6) 
Perhaps, the reality of the intentions behind these actions is better understood through the 
detailed action plan that fell short of any sense of practicality. Since the vision for clearance 
was revealed only through the press, no alternative plans for compensation or relocation were 
offered to the residents. Although officials revealed that these schemes were drafted mainly to 
regulate streets, an undisclosed deal for state-led development with the nationalised private 
sector was partially agreed; investment grounds in such locations were assured. Yet, that 
sector was wary of investing in projects on occupied urban lands, which seemed quite risky 
and expensive, and required substantial funding towards any fixation procedures. This 
resulted in further problems and the old districts remained in a state of decline for many years 
to follow. Despite the lack of authentic identity, the outcomes of planning attempts in Cairo 
were relatively successful and harmless in the development of new areas on the outskirts of 
the capital but had devastating effects on the more complex and problematic districts, which 
needed a more comprehensive and regulated process to deal with multi-faceted problems 
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beyond the physical characteristics; and the realisation of such a task was largely beyond the 
cognition of the system in place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Artificial display of abstract modernisation 
Henry Sanoff argues that the quality of the public realm is structured according to our 
perceptions of the daily life and in the social performance, activities, and interaction attitudes 
of users of the urban space. These perceptions develop in accordance with the values people 
attribute to their lived spaces, which in return enhance the meaning of the space.74 Both the 
visual quality and the meaning and values of the lived space maintain a reciprocal process of 
integration and mutual influence, in which each contributes to and influences the 
development of the other. While planners and planning institutions in Egypt tended to 
promptly reassess the meaning and desirability of built environments, it emerges that what 
constituted a successful plan for the past was no longer acceptable for the present, and what 
was minimalist and poor in quality has become appreciated and has retained eventual 
valuable meaning.75 For example, wide streets and high rise buildings were formerly seen as 
unsafe places and disconnected from active social life in medieval Cairo; hence, the meaning 
and values of the latter became associated with poverty, lack of resources. Their display, as a 
Fig. 6 Bold lines show the cutting through 50-metre street proposed for the district of Bulaq. 
Source: Department of Certified Projects, Cairo Governorate. 
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result, was regarded as undesirable, whereas ideals represented by wider streets and high-rise 
buildings later become crucial signs of modernised environments.  
Such changing perceptions and values, therefore, fundamentally influenced actions for 
modernising Cairo from one era to another and particularly during the Nasser years. 
Understanding the shared values and sometimes ambiguous meanings of urban contexts 
proved essential to determination of the appropriateness and achievement of &DLUR¶Vspatial 
qualities. Their scope, arguably, needed to be determined through an in-depth examination of 
the meaning and values people attribute to their experience of the urban spaces, and therefore 
their control through appropriate legislation has always been inevitable. Whilst such 
legislation has no direct involvement in managing these values, it is crucial to the process of 
changing the urban fabric through the managed control of urban transformation from one 
state to another, e.g. from low-rise and dense to high-rise stretches of urban landscape. While 
the planner/designer develops the anticipated image through a detailed program of actions, 
the legislation provides the legal tools to facilitate the implementation of these actions. 
Hence, in the process of remaking existing urban settings such as that of the older districts of 
Cairo, legislation is considered the principal tool in either ensuring the success of the 
transformation process or supplying the reason for its failure. 
One significant role of legislations in urban transformation is to facilitate urban change 
through demolition and rebuilding by formalising certain building restrictions on building 
heights and setbacks. Demolition legislations, for example, were put in place when it was 
proved that renewal actions were not viable options in light of the extreme deterioration and 
economic necessity and therefore the implementation of certain measures of legal control 
becomes subject to its relevance to the desired process and actions of change. In fact, many of 
the relatively modern areas in Cairo, built under colonization, such as Cairo downtown, 
evidently have a distinctive quality that is in a stark contrast to older districts, such as the old 
Fatimid Cairo, which experienced successive layers of urban transformation. It would be 
almost impossible to spatially maintain each of these areas unless planning regulations 
considered the differences among them or what people regard as their distinctive urban 
character. The attributes of the district of Garden City for example are entirely different from 
those of in old Cairo, or Nasr City. Hence, a unified planning regulation system for one city 
proved problematic and unjustifiable in various respects. Such a system needs to be based on 
urban legislations that takes account of the infinite variety of human activity and includes 
renewal and conservation policies, expressed through specific development plans and 
acknowledgement of the implications of redevelopment. 
    The planning authorities, on their part, struggled to define the actual needs for delivering 
modernised places, or an overarching strategy for the long-term improvement of WKH FLW\¶V
existing districts. The rules and law issued in relation to the development of Cairo lacked any 
supporting consultation, feedback or study of the local needs, or what makes an urban space 
of certain value. The XUEDQIDEULFRIPHGLHYDODQGROG&DLURµJUDGXDOO\GHWHULRUDWHGDQGPDQ\
KLVWRULF VWUXFWXUHV ZHUH ORVW WR XUEDQ XSJUDGLQJ SURMHFWV¶76 It could be argued that this 
derived from the lack of reference to academic studies to investigate, describe, and evaluate 
these needs. Local planning applications in Egypt, in general terms, do not require any social 
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VWXG\ RU LQYHVWLJDWLRQ RI SHRSOH¶V UHVSRQVHV LQ VWDUN FRQWUDVW ZLWK FRXQWHUSDUW (XURSHDQ
legislations. Despite the long history of Egyptian planning practices, and their association 
with Europe, their slow progress in developing a substantial structure of effective and well-
informed planning legislation affected the formation and effectiveness of associated urban 
legislations. It was not until 2009 that planning policies started to incorporate and further 
consider aspects of planning needs and drivers, such as social control, economic growth and 
issue relevant to spatial quality.77 Specifically, the need to design policies for its achievement 
was somehow underestimated in the tradition of remaking places in Cairo. As a critical 
practice of urban design, planners in Cairo need to expand their scope to determine and plan 
IRUTXDOLW\RXWFRPHVDQGSHRSOH¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHUHVXUJHQFHSURFHVV 
Besides, the arena of planning legislation, building codes, and their executive regulations 
LQWURGXFHGGXULQJ1DVVHU¶VUXOHZDVILOOHGZLWKDSOHWKRUDRIFRPSOH[DQGRYHUODSSLQJODZV
and decrees. However, it is noted that also planning laws and building codes, approved 
during the 1970s in Egypt, were questioned in terms of their effective application within 
residential areas of Cairo, and their negative influence on the resultant spatial qualities of the 
city. The lack of legal stability regarding planning legislation was apparent to the extent that 
every failure to implement was followed by a series of ill thought out laws that, arguably, 
lacked the necessary practical basis and worsened the deterioration of the built environment. 
It shows that controlling quality was seen, for the first time in Cairo, to be possible through 
re-making, rather than making: adjustment and enhancement of the existing urban fabric 
rather than clearance and imposing new physical structures.        
Despite the fact that modernising plans for the old districts were barely executed, its 
upgrading remained part of the reform ambitions as captivated by ideals of socialism and the 
evident desire for a national character of modernity. Modernisation attempts, however, 
remained vague and widely impractical, which was one of the flaws of a regime that was 
µSURPLVLQJ D ORW DQG GHOLYHULQJ OLWWOH¶ DV 1DVVHU 5DEEDW VWDWHG78 Officials consecutively 
failed to justify reasons behind the lack of implementation, which had effectively 
FRPSURPLVHGWKH(J\SWLDQV¶FRQILGHnce in the system. In contrast with modern districts such 
as Nasr City, the government in fact targeted old areas to tackle problems of decline and 
overpopulation, resulting from heavy industries being concentrated around these areas, and 
not to promote affordable housing, as the state propaganda suggested. Under the pressure of 
fast-growing population rates and deep informality, the reality of such decisions became more 
evident DIWHUµWKRXVDQGVRIKHFWDUHVRIIDUPODQGZHUHFRQYHUWHGLQWRXUEDQDUHDV¶DQG living 
places became inadequate.79  
As explained, under the rising notions of urban order and modernity married with socialist 
ideals, western models of urbanism were injected into the authentic fabric of the city. The 
strong display of visual structures of buildings, squares and streets was anticipated to signify 
authority, supremacy and discipline, and therefore turned into acknowledged models of 
success. Even for the colonisers during post-liberation periods, a determined pattern for 
&DLUR¶Vurban development was flagged with living conceptions designed only for the foreign 
elites.80 Historically, since the mid-QLQHWHHQWK FHQWXU\ &DLUR¶V XUEDQLVP ZDV PL[HG ZLWK
aristocratic and high-standard living developments inaugurated by the protectorates. Districts 
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such as Garden City and Heliopolis flourished in the Cairo cityscape to symbolise the rise of 
a new type of modern society. In fact, Nasser was circumscribed by his political operations to 
the degree that the government was in no position to produce any new solutions for the city 
and moreover, over imported designs and materials that would support this trend (Figure 7).81  
The on-JRLQJGHFOLQHRI&DLUR¶VROGHUdistricts reveals elements of unreliability on the part 
of the planning institution in carrying out a controlled change towards a modern urban reality. 
For this, the institution seemed to abandon the idea of undertaking upgrading projects On the 
other hand, the complex bureaucratic regulatory planning system set up in Egypt by the 
government and professional planning authorities had become a great obstacle in the 
remaking process. The more urban planning regulations are approved, the more 
confrontations with residents emerge, and the less development is achieved. While solving 
the problems of deterioration in Cairo and other major cities is considered a higher priority 
for the government and planning authority, limited response has impeded the achievement of 
a rapid solution. The search for a possible way out has revealed the need for a redefinition of 
the working structure of the institution and its tasks.82 There is an apparent need to justify, 
control, formalize, DQG LPSURYH WKHFLW\¶VXUEDQTXDOLW\ LQJHQHUDODQG Lts spatial quality in 
particular. However, in the absence of a discrete and unified legislative system to integrate 
and coordinate aspects of the urban space, physically and socially, these basic objectives will 
not become a reality. 
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Conclusion 
When Nasser died in 1970, the military largely dominated the vast and complex bureaucratic 
system and structure that had led (J\SW¶VSROLWLFDOVFHQH for decades. In the early days of the 
25 January revolution, millions of Egyptians took to Tahrir Square to revolt against Hosni 
0XEDUDN¶V UHJLPH and its military roots. 1DVVHU¶V Socialist Union building, which later 
became the National Democratic Party (NDP) headquarters, was set ablaze: an event seen as 
symbolic of the collapse of the former regime.83  Tahrir Square stirred up memories of 
freedom and pride, in the search for liberal and democratic systems of good governance, 
whereas the NDP had long exhibited the opposite values through a corrupt regime and abuse 
of power. Two and a half years later, and following the struggle between secular parties and 
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) Islamic government to reach consensus on civic democratic 
institutions, the military re-emerged as power broker and a protector of the state. Today it is 
DV FOHDU DV HYHU WKDW 1DVVHU¶V VWUDWHJ\ of a military-influenced governmental structure has 
become the main ingredient of state management in Egypt,Q1DVVHU¶VGD\s, the square and 
surrounding buildings mediated symbols of modernisation. The contest over power and 
leadership, between the military¶V conservative approach from one side and the revolutionary 
civilian parties from the other, remains undecided.84 
 
 
Fig. 7 Map and Aerial View of the Garden City District in Cairo. 
Map Source: Cairo and environs map in 1914. 
Image Source: Clerget, Le Caire, 1934, pl. 10. 
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Indeed, Cairo is a different city today than it was at the time of Nasser and the RIILFHUV¶ 
revolution, not least because of the growing influence of such political implications. While 
modern Egypt is fashioned with more Islamic traditions, particularly set in the FLW\¶V
impoverished old districts, yet it has never lost its faith in tolerance and inclusivity, dreams 
that were endangered during the short-lived MB rule. The paper has elucidated how 
modernisation of &DLUR XQGHU 1DVVHU¶V OHDGHUVKLS became a strategic priority to prove that 
Egypt was moving away from its past. This was evident in the visual appearance of the city, 
which became, for the first time, characterised by high-rise building, and notions of global 
international styles of architecture and planning. Whilst the Cairo Governorate remains the 
powerful planning institution, its system of operations and decision-making has not changed 
much since Nasser¶V WLPH. Throughout all its planning proposals, the people in old districts 
have been subjected to tremendous pressure from government officials and private developers 
to abandon their lands and give way to new developments. However, the call for modernity 
has been replaced by the interest of giant private investment companies in a new-liberal 
capitalist economy. 
 But throughout the current instability in Egyptian politics, under the game of politics, 
Nasser remains as one of the few to understand that appearance counts for the image of the 
country and its power. He realised the significance of satisfying the demands of ordinary 
working class Egyptians, with strategic focus on instantly materialising what he thought to be 
fulfilling their needs through grand actions and strict legislations WR DIILUP WKH QDWLRQ¶V
modern image of the capital and its built environment. It is also vital to view the legitimacy of 
1DVVHU¶V revolutionary rule and practices as based on the nation¶V trust in Nasser¶VSULPDU\
institution, the army, as the protector of the state, where modernity in this sense was strictly 
managed. 
Fig. 8 An Egyptian citizen looking towards the Mugamma Complex located in Tahrir Square built 
in the early years of the 1952 revolution.  
Source: online source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/egyptian_focus/5422306056/  
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7KLVSDSHUDLPHGWRLQYHVWLJDWH1DVVHU¶VVRFLDOLVWLGHRORJLHVDQGFKDQQHOVRIGHYHORSPHQW
for assembling a new face for Egypt. The Governorate, to a certain extent, relied on fixed 
legislations and imported ideas of modern urbanism that appeared impractical in re-planning 
the older districts of Cairo. Indeed, Nasserite Egypt was clearly anchored in his ideologies to 
represent Egypt as a regional power with various levels of modernity and order. While 
inherited practices of modernisation helped to develop new, remote and desert areas of the 
city, it failed to deal with the problems and social complexity of old districts, with profound 
effects on their developments for decades to follow. Similar to many other nations in the post-
colonial era, these attempts reflect the uncompromising power of a solid regime while 
confirming the struggle to implement a rational administrative structure. The interest was 
rather superficial. Genuine interest and professional attitude to planning, projects and 
initiatives in old districts would have helped to achieve defined objectives and goals. Instead, 
modernity under Nasser was more about rejoicing in visions of resurgence largely seen as 
superficial and utopian. 
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